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This paper reflects the implications of enlargement for the EU’s migration policy, particularly for the fight against illegal
immigration, the management of external border controls, and the application of the Schengen acquis after accession. Structural
and procedural problems that might be aggravated after enlargement are also analysed.
I. The Framework
The fight against illegal immigration has been a priority
for previous Presidencies of the Council of the EU, as it
also is for the Greek Presidency. Illegal immigration is
a matter of major concern for most Member States of the
EU; Greece, with its particular geographical situation
and its maritime landscape dotted with thousands of
islands, has a justifiable interest in the management of
external border controls and the fight against illegal
immigration.2
Recent polls of EU citizens3 have shown that freedom
and security rate high in their concerns. Immigration
involves both freedom of movement (in the area without
internal border controls of the so-called Schengen
Member States) and security (due to the fact that immi-
gration as a whole, and particularly illegal immigration,
is still seen today by many as a security issue). Immi-
gration used to be tackled as a technical problem, to be
discussed between the Governments of the Member
States, but has evolved a global perspective that takes
into account its legal, political and social aspects, as
well as its strong connection to the Union’s external
action.
For example, at the Seville Council, held during the
Spanish Presidency, immigration was a priority on the
agenda; the Presidency and the United Kingdom propo-
sed that economic “sanctions” should be taken against
third countries which would not comply or co-operate
with the EU’s policy on the prevention of illegal immi-
gration.4 However, other Member States strongly oppos-
ed this proposal, arguing that it would affect human
rights issues and that it would be difficult to impose it
on third countries; the final text approved makes referen-
ce to a possible review of relations with third countries
which don’t co-operate with the EU on migration issues.5
Following the Seville Council Conclusions, the Euro-
pean Commission presented on December 2002 a Com-
munication on the integration of migration issues in the
EU’s relationship with third countries.6
Another interesting illustration of this evolution was
the proposal to create an inter-pillar7 high level group
to discuss migration and to address its root causes and
implications in a horizontal, comprehensive way: not
only concentrating on repressive measures, but also on
integration, information, external policy, co-operation
with third countries and development aid.8 Well-
intentioned though this initiative was, it had limited
practical results due to difficulties in implementing the
measures approved; in fact, those measures implied that
migration policy should be integrated into the Union’s
foreign policy and development policies.  In addition,
the co-operation of third countries in implementing the
proposed action plans was vital, but was rather difficult
to accomplish, since the target countries of the action
plans regarded this as a unilateral application by the EU.
To understand the phenomena of the fight against
illegal immigration and the EU’s immigration policy
today, we have to bear in mind that Europe was tradi-
tionally an emigration area. Today most Member States
still have very large national communities living abroad,
either in other Member States or in other continents of
the world, notably North America and Australia. This
traditional culture of emigration might explain how
difficult it has been in recent decades for EU countries
to recognise, acknowledge and adapt to the fact that
they are indeed, today, countries of immigration. In
historic terms, this phenomenon is relatively recent and
quite dramatic, due to the steady increase of large
numbers of immigrants and asylum seekers, and to the
problems of illegal immigration and, more recently,
trafficking in human beings. However, if the traditional
culture of immigration can explain some reluctance to
adapt to being a host country, it does not explain very
well the difficulties in tackling legal migration and the
integration of legal immigrants which, in a coherent
migration policy that encompasses the dynamics of
inclusion and exclusion, have to be seen as a counterpart
of the fight against illegal immigration.
Many still see immigration as a security issue, which
must be dealt with through repressive measures and thehttp://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2003/1 37
strengthening of border controls, and through exchange
of information and close co-operation between the
Member States. However, many changes have recently
taken place in the EU’s policies: following a report from
the United Nations on world demographic tendencies
and projections,9 a discussion was opened on the need
to have a more open immigration policy in Europe,
rather than a zero policy, which is no longer justifiable
or desirable. This remains valid although a report from
the European Commission stated that immigration alone
can’t correct the effects of an ageing population.10 Even
recognising this much, harmonisation at EU level on
this matter is scarce, and the majority of the Member
States still maintain restrictive immigration policies
and limited measures for the active integration of third
country nationals legally as residents in their national
territories.11
The approach of the EU to the fight against illegal
immigration includes measures on border controls, on
preventing illegal residence and illegal employment in
the territory of the Member States, and on penalties for
those who provide aid for illegal immigration and
facilitation of unauthorised entry, as well as on a policy
for the return of illegal immigrants, based on the
conclusion of readmission agreements with several
countries of origin and transit.12 The conditions of entry
and residence, the issuing of visas, including family
reunification and integration measures, constitute an
important part of the EU’s migration policy, that should
involve a balanced approach between repressive and
integration measures.13
Further, immigration matters are closely connected
with the fight against serious crime, organised and
transborder crime, and the fight against terrorism. EU
Member States are parties to the United Nations Con-
vention against Transnational Organised Crime that
features two additional Protocols, one against the Smugg-
ling of Migrants by Land, Sea and Air and another to
Prevent, Suppress and Punish the Trafficking in Persons,
especially Women and Children.14 At the EU level, the
strong determination of Member States to fight these
forms of crime raised concerns from the United Nations
High Commissioner on Refugees (UNHCR) as to the
situation of asylum seekers caught in situations of
smuggling or trafficking, and the protection of victims
of trafficking.15
It is in this light that the challenges of enlargement
vis-à-vis the fight against illegal immigration at EU
level have to be analysed.
II. The Challenges
Several factors may indeed have an influence on the
current European strategy for tackling illegal immi-
gration after enlargement; they include formal, structural
and legal factors, all of which have some bearing on the
matter:
1. co-ordination difficulties (in a Europe of 25 national
systems, after 2004)
2. shifting of external borders to the east
3. future changes in decision making procedures.
1. Co-ordination after Enlargement
Immigration and the policies of admission and exclusion
from the national territories are acutely sensitive issues
for the Member States. It is quite paradigmatic that, even
though immigration is included, since 1999, in Title IV
of the EC Treaty, decisions still have to be taken by
unanimous voting on most issues.16 The difficulty in co-
ordinating the extremely different systems that currently
exist in the Member States has to be recognised. All
Member States have different national systems and
structures for analysing asylum requests, for issuing
visas and residence permits, for the management of
borders and for co-ordinating and exchanging infor-
mation amongst their national authorities. The need for
harmonisation at EU level, for the creation of common
systems, common standards and a common approach,
has been in some ways curtailed by national difficulties
in changing legislation and structures, by pressure from
public opinion and by the cumbersome decision making
procedures on immigration issues at EU level.
If co-ordination and harmonisation face insurmoun-
table difficulties today, how will work progress in a
Europe of 25?.17 Candidate Countries have been
changing their legislation, structures and procedures in
line with the complex ‘acquis communautaire’, in order
to adapt them to EU standards – but will it be enough?.
Let’s take as an example the management of external
border controls, an area where good coordination and
exchange of information is vital: border control autho-
rities in the Member States range from military bodies
to civil services, from paramilitary structures to police
forces. In some countries, different entities are in charge
of land, maritime and air borders. In others, several
entities are involved and competencies are divided
between immigration controls and border patrols. The
complexity of the structures, procedures and entities
involved might have contributed for the delay in creating
a European Border Guard: a proposal that was, after
initial enthusiasm, left for the longer term.18
Another problem of co-ordination concerns the
exchange of information. The Member States cooperate
closely on exchanging information on migration flows,
specifically through the Council working group CIREFI
(Centre d’information, de réflexion et d’échanges en
matière de franchissement des frontières et d’immi-
gration) – this will become even more complex with 10
new countries joining, making it essential to have
thorough analyses of the information gathered.
2. External Border Controls to the East
The second factor which could influence the EU’s
migration policy after enlargement is the shifting of
external border controls to the east. The Schengen
Agreements gave a new perspective to immigration
policies by abolishing internal border controls, creating
an area of freedom of movement, and by introducing a
system of compensatory measures to cope with a possible
increase in organised crime; consequently, external
border controls were strengthened, uniform short visas
were created and police and judicial co-operation was38 Eipascope 2003/1 http://www.eipa.nl
stepped up with the introduction of the Schengen Infor-
mation System. Schengen functioned as a laboratory for
the EU Member States and constituted a form of closer
co-operation for those who wanted to move more quickly
towards the objectives of achieving an area without
internal borders and common immigration policies.
Also, fines were stepped up for carriers transporting
people without appropriate documents, and for aiding
illegal immigration.
But Schengen harmonisation is far from perfect:
uniform visas only allow for short stays, national visas
can be issued for longer periods (making it difficult to
control the movement of those citizens holding national
visas, since there are no internal border controls), and the
situation of long term residents and their rights was not
regulated.
The Schengen space pushed away external border
controls to an exterior belt, that should be so much
stronger as it weakest link.19 Abolishing the borders
altogether would put in peril the whole concept of the
State as we know it; this makes the area of freedom of
movement an even greater achievement, by managing
to push out, to an exterior belt, the immigration border
controls of the Member States, and by allowing each one
of them to control the entry of third country nationals to
the whole Schengen space. It functions as a “ring”,
whose role is to protect and to divert pressure from the
centre to the exterior ring.
On the other hand, the tightening of border controls
might lead to an even greater desire to avoid them. In
fact, the strengthening of border controls and a strict
immigration policy on admission might be a key pull
factor for immigrants (if the doors are closing, something
worthwhile must be inside), for aid to illegal immigration
and trafficking in human beings (the development of
organised criminal networks which profit from immi-
grants desire for a better life) and for the difficulties of
the return process (immigrants will be reluctant to leave,
since they’ll know it will be virtually impossible to
return).
As regards enlargement, Member States concerns
have been identified primarily as:
• On the one hand, that the freedom of movement and
the lifting of internal border controls will lead to a
migration flow from candidate countries to current
Member States, swamping the labour market.
From an historical perspective, and analysing pre-
vious enlargements, there is apparently little justification
for this fear; there was no massive influx to other Member
States in the past – indeed, quite the contrary. Added to
the fact that economic conditions improved in the new
Member States, an important psychological factor for
citizens of the new States is acknowledging their right
to freedom of movement and establishment, rather than
actually exercising this right. The European Commission
confirmed that the effect would be limited and more
cross-border mobility can be expected initially, from
east to west, even if some countries will be more affected
than others.20
• On the other hand, concerns of an influx of illegal
immigration from third countries to the east are
connected with the need for integrated border
management, for teams of joint border controls and
also for burden sharing, both financial and
operational.
The Candidate Countries will in the future also
apply the Schengen “acquis”, in full, and have been
preparing for the lifting of external border controls
through legislative, operational and technical measures.
Internal border controls will not be automatically remov-
ed after accession; this depends on the evaluation of the
standards and the compliance with the “acquis” by the
Schengen Evaluation Committee21. Enlargement can
also bring additional complexities to this area due to
geographical factors (neighbouring countries, the extent
of the candidate countries’ land borders), structural
factors (decision making, voting) and solidarity (the
burden sharing proposed for border control measures).
3. Decision Making Procedures
The restructuring of this area of complex decision making,
where decisions taken are not applicable to all Member
States (there are opt outs from Title IV for the UK, Ireland
and Denmark) and where different legal instruments
apply,22 not all of them legally binding and not all with
direct effect, is urgent.23 Even if, in principle, the co-
decision procedure will apply after the five-year tran-
sitional period, this will not be automatically effective
and will need a decision taken unanimously by the
Council, in each and every area. Therefore, it is not yet
known to which areas the codecision procedure and
qualified majority will apply. The Treaty of Nice, which
recently entered into force, anticipated the application
of co-decision and qualified majority voting for some
areas.24
Another important element is the fact there there will
be no opt outs for the candidate countries, as regards
Title IV TEC or the application of the Schengen acquis
– both will apply fully and without exceptions such as
those which are currently valid for three Member States,
according to the respective Protocols annexed to the
Treaty of Amsterdam.25
The Convention on the Future of Europe (Working
Group X, on Freedom Security and Justice) studied in
detail the problems involved, both at the level of sim-
plifying the instruments and integrating the area into a
“pillarless” structure that would take into account some
particularities, and at the level of reviewing decision
making procedures and the underlining principles of
this policy area. The final report from Group X (CONV
426/02, of 2 December 02) revealed divisions on some
controversial proposals, which were left for the European
Convention to decide upon and address in a wider
context.26
However, the results that will come out of the
European Convention are directly relevant to this area:
if the pillar structure is abolished, migration policy as
well as police and judicial cooperation in criminalhttp://www.eipa.nl Eipascope 2003/1 39
matters will be integrated into a coherent structure. It
remains to be seen whether co-decision will apply, and
what exceptions and specific conditions will be taken
into account for some policy areas.
Conclusions
The accession of the Candidate Countries (10 in the near
future) will certainly have an impact on the EU’s migration
policies, as it will undeniably have in other areas of
Community action. The most visible impact will be the
shifting of border controls to the east (when Schengen
is applied), as well as the increased external land border
of the EU.
A problem might arise if neighbouring Candidate
Countries start applying Schengen at different times,
and consequently remove internal border controls at
different moments in time, which might call for a co-
ordinated regional approach, in order to save efforts and
resources.27, 28
In general, the impact of enlargement should be
considered positively, taking into account the conside-
rable efforts put into place, on one hand, by the Candidate
Countries in order to be ready and comply in full with
the acquis, and on the other hand by the EU (both the
Commission and the Member States) through several
training and twinning programmes29 in support of those
efforts. Further, the reforms that are taking place at EU
level and through the European Convention and its
Forum lead to expectations of improvement on the
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